Precursors to the Emergency

Vinson Prakash *

1975–a country in turmoil, a ‘dictator’ at the helm, political sycophancy at an all-time high, and civil liberties ripped from the Constitution. India’s State of Emergency is described in such evocative terms. A country with just over 25 years of independence had receded to having an autocrat. One who points and orders. No questions asked. No due process. No justifications. But how did this happen? What pushed the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, to take up such an extreme measure? This article takes up this question and traces the culmination of the Emergency by poring over the post-Independence period, the growing pains of a new democracy, and a beleaguered Indira Gandhi.

The Emergency must be understood in the context of events stemming from Indira Gandhi’s rise to power, a lengthy period of national unrest, the post-war economy, radical movements, ideologically incongruent Opposition alliances, and ultimately, the Allahabad High Court judgement. This article draws extensively from two seminal texts on the subject: India since Independence by Bipin Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee; and India’s First Dictatorship: The Emergency, 1975-77 by Christophe Jaffrelot and Pratinav Anil.

The Post-Independence Battleground

Let us first set out the political landscape of post-Independence India in which Indira Gandhi rose to power. India’s parliamentary democracy was endowed with a medley of ideologically diverse political parties: The Congress, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party and the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (Chandra et.al., 2008). The Congress derived its legitimacy from its leadership of the Independence movement and its role in establishing the first democratic rule. The Opposition parties were individually quite weak, but they vigorously campaigned for alternative sets of policies during Congress’ regime.

After the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in May 1964, the incumbent leader of Congress, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was handpicked by a group known as the Syndicate, consisting of K Kamaraj, the Congress president, and regional party leaders, Atulya Ghosh of Bengal, SK Patil of Bombay, N Sanjeeva Reddy of Andhra Pradesh, and S Nijalingappa of Mysore. The Syndicate was a powerful group consisting of leaders from non-Hindi states and they held great influence over the party’s administration. They wanted a leader that they could bend to their will and Shastri fit the bill.

The untimely death of Shastri, 19 months into his premiership, brought the issue of succession to the fore again. The Syndicate’s predilection towards a candidate who could defeat a resurgent Gujarat leader, Morarji Desai, but still remain pliable found its expression in Indira Gandhi. She was Nehru’s daughter, had national appeal, and possessed a progressive image, which made her an attractive candidate for the Syndicate. She defeated Morarji Desai for the premiership by 355 votes to 169 in a secret ballot.

The Rise of Indira Gandhi

On January 24, 1966, Indira Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister of India. India since Independence describes the advent of her premiership as being marked by continuous turmoil, mass economic discontent, and political agitations sparked by spiralling prices, food scarcity, and growing unemployment.

There were demonstrations, student strikes, riots, and agitations by government servants–all commencing at about the same time she was being sworn in. Bandhs and strikes became a new feature of protests, which involved closing down all businesses, schools, and government jobs/offices. In essence, towns, cities, or even entire states were closed down, and the agitating crowds clashed with lathi-wielding police.

Further, there were constant disruptions in Parliament that year. Indira Gandhi had to endure vulgar personal attacks, male chauvinist and sexist references, and unfounded allegations. She also couldn’t form her own cabinet and had to capitulate all important portfolios to the regional satraps of the Syndicate. Her rise to premiership was followed by an election year (1967), so she had to tolerate any depreciation hurled at her until then.

In the 1967 Lok Sabha elections, Congress retained power at the Centre by winning 284 of the 520 seats. However, it lost its majority in eight states, indicating a decline in the party’s national dominance, and people’s dissatisfaction with the system of governance. This election marked the beginning of coalition governments–a factor which would later play an important role in her decision to impose the Emergency. At this juncture, smaller parties united to dethrone Congress and gain momentum for advancing their ideological visions for India.

There were constant disruptions in Parliament in 1966. Indira Gandhi had to endure vulgar personal attacks, male chauvinist and sexist references and unfounded allegations. She also couldn’t form her own cabinet and had to capitulate all important portfolios to the regional satraps of the Syndicate.

However, these alliances suffered from constant tensions and internal strains. State governments would often get dissolved, reform, change partners, go under Presidential Rule, or hold mid-term polls. From 1967-1970, Bihar had seven governments, Uttar Pradesh four, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and West Bengal three each, Kerala with two, and eight spells of Presidential Rule in seven states, as noted by Chandra et al., (2008). The warning bells should’ve rung in the Opposition’s ears at this point. The realisation that coalitions were inviable, visions and ideologies irreconcilable, and future partnerships inadvisable dawned on them neither in the run?up to the next elections nor during their later attempts to cease Indira Gandhi’s tenure.

By 1969, Indira Gandhi had gained enormous influence within the party, which many saw as a threat to the Syndicate. The Syndicate began plotting to oust her from office using Sanjiva Reddy’s presidency, and Indira Gandhi fought back with no holds barred. She snatched the finance portfolio from Morarji Desai on the grounds that he was incapable of implementing her economic programme as a conservative; she announced the nationalisation of 14 major banks through a Presidential ordinance; and announced her plan to withdraw the special privileges of the erstwhile princes1 . Implementing some of the Congress’ Ten-Point Programme’s goals made her a champion of the masses and her popularity soared throughout the country. But it also led to the split of the Congress Party into Congress (Organisation) and Congress (Requisionists). Congress (O) was led by the Syndicate and Indira Gandhi formed Congress (R).

The Game of Thrones

Taking note of the national mood of despair, frustration and cynicism that prevailed since 1962, her seemingly radical and egalitarian programme and slogans garnered widespread public support. Her zealous efforts towards economic reform and satisfying national sentiments were however curtailed by Congress’ minority government. She had to depend on other parties to get legislation passed in the Lok Sabha. So, when the Supreme Court refused to abolish privy purses, she took the opportunity to dissolve the Lok Sabha on December 27, 1970, and called election in February 1971–a year ahead of schedule.

Once again, coalition governments became a feature of elections. However, this time the Opposition didn’t band together to form minority-governments; they had a singular goal: Remove Indira Gandhi from power. They joined hands not in friendship, but in defiance, and formed ideologically incongruent alliances. The non-Communist Opposition parties–Congress (O), the Jan Sangh, Swatantra and the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP)–formed a ‘Grand Alliance’. Their campaign slogan–true to their lack of ideological coherence and unitary goal–was ‘Indira Hatao’ (Remove Indira). And their campaign strategy? Hurling personal abuses and character assassination of Indira Gandhi².

By 1969, Indira Gandhi had gained enormous influence within the party, which many saw as a threat to the Syndicate. The Syndicate began plotting to oust her from office using Sanjiva Reddy’s presidency, and Indira Gandhi fought back with no holds barred.

Contrarily, Indira Gandhi’s campaign was focused on the growth of the public sector, imposing ceilings on rural landholdings and personal property, reducing inequalities in income and opportunity, and abolishing princely privileges. She turned the Opposition’s slogan on its head and used it as ‘Garibi Hatao’ (Remove Poverty), and appealed to the deprived and disadvantaged groups of the country, as well as the middle class by promising them a stable government and action against forces of violence and disorder. The result, a clean sweep. Congress (R) won 352 of the 518 Lok-Sabha seats, giving them the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution. The Congress was revived and was back to its dominant position in Indian politics.

The Indo-Pakistan War

Now, Congress’ focus turned to the states. They had to acquire a majority in the states to implement the reforms they sought. But, before the state elections could take place the following year, the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 erupted. Indira Gandhi’s leadership in India’s definitive victory over Pakistan came as a double-edged sword–it cemented public confidence in her, but bled the Indian economy.

A civil war was underway in East Pakistan, nine months before India’s militaristic intervention in December 1971–a war between secessionists and nationalists. The internal war was a consequence of General Yahya Khan’s refusal to relinquish his presidency of Pakistan to its rightful successor, the Awami League’s leader, Sheikh Mujibar Rahman.

East Pakistan, though more populous than West Pakistan, suffered from the ignorance of the western elite, who held political power in post-independent Pakistan3 . The unfulfilled grievances of the Eastern populace led to the formation of several political parties, of which the Awami League was the most dominant. The ultimate ‘toppling’ of the military government through democratic polls was unacceptable to Yahya Khan, and the West Pakistan-based military government dismissed the results and began mass killings of Bengalis in East Pakistan.

Subsequently, East Pakistan plunged into different kinds of violent conflict. A military rebellion, mob violence, military crackdown, mutiny within armed forces, urban terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and death squads–all became a feature of the civil war. Rahman was arrested and airlifted to a jail in West Pakistan; the army attacked the student hall in Dhaka University and killed unarmed students; civilians from villages, who were suspected of being ex-police, armed rebels, or Indian infiltrators, were summarily executed, and their bodies were stacked and set on fire4 . The reign of terror displaced millions of the East Pakistan populace, creating a massive flight of 10 million refugees to India. The Eastern Indian states set up refugee camps along the border, and India allocated enormous resources of a poor country for the refugees.

Mitra et al. (2023) note that Indira Gandhi tried to rally the international community to aid the refugee crisis but was unsuccessful. First, the Indian embassies were mobilised, and then she embarked on a world tour to the US and Europe to garner some economic relief. All her speeches made it clear that India was running out of resources to support refugees and some form of international action would be required. In November, her stance became more aggressive and she stated: “I very authoritatively say that I will not tolerate these refugees living in India. I am very definite and so is our entire country. We have borne a very big burden with hardly any help from outside, and when we drew the attention of the UN, we were given the answer: ‘It is an internal problem of Pakistan. We cannot interfere in it.’ There are nearly 10 million people and the UN just says ‘we are very sorry, we do not mind if millions of people have been killed in Pakistan, it is an internal matter of Pakistan’.”⁵

On November 25, a state of Emergency was declared in Pakistan, and it launched pre-emptive strikes against India on December 3. Indira Gandhi pronounced that ‘the war in Bangladesh has become a war on India’ and authorised retaliatory strikes, including a full-scale invasion of Pakistan, involving the Indian Air Force, Navy, and Army. On December 16, India would emerge victorious–a ceasefire was announced and the Eastern Command of the Pakistan military signed the Instrument of Surrender in Dhaka.

The success of December 1971 would bestow upon Indira Gandhi, the monikers of ‘Mother India’, ‘Empress of India’, and the invincible ‘Durga’. Her victory is often said to be a watershed moment in Indian history as not only did it come over India’s hostile neighbour, but she broke Pakistan into two– creating Bangladesh as we know it today.

The Indira Wave

Indira Gandhi would reach the pinnacle of her popularity after the war and the post-war ‘Indira wave’ lent its hand in the upcoming state elections. In March 1972, the legislative assembly elections in all states except Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Orissa were held. The result, a Congress majority. Power fell back into their hands and they had command over the Centre as well as most states. Several developmental initiatives followed: general insurance and the coal industry were nationalised, ceilings were imposed on urban landownership, a cheap foodgrain distribution programme and an employment scheme were implemented for vulnerable sections in rural areas, all nationalised banks were mandated to open branches in small towns, rural clusters and poorer parts of cities, among others⁶.

The Run up to the Emergency

The beginning of 1973 marked the decline of Indira Gandhi’s popularity. There was little progress made in alleviating poverty, addressing economic inequality, and reducing caste and class oppression in the countryside7 . The problems of recession, unemployment, rampant inflation and scarcity of food persisted despite the measures taken by the government and created a serious crisis. These problems were exacerbated by a drought in most parts of the country, a decrease in power generation, the notorious rise of oil prices, and the cost of sheltering 10 million refugees. The perils of Indira Gandhi’s 1967 tenure returned to haunt her and Congress.

The beginning of 1973 marked the decline of Indira Gandhi’s popularity. There was little progress made in alleviating poverty, addressing economic inequality, and reducing caste and class oppression in the countryside.

Public discontent, once again, found its expression in protests, movements and unrest in various parts of the country, particularly in Gujarat and Bihar. The price of meat, foodgrains, and edible oil had risen by over 30 percent and essentials such as oil, butter, and kerosene were mainly found in the black market8 . The year long spell of protests and violent unrest in Gujarat reached its climax in January 1974–a major protest broke out, accompanied by strikes, looting, rioting, arson, and efforts to force MLAs to resign. The Jan Sangh and Congress (O) MLAs resigned, so had 95 Congress legislators, often under threat. Some had their houses burnt down while others were “publicly beaten, a few were tarred or stripped naked and forced to ride on donkeys”⁹. Consequently, the Centre was forced to dissolve the state government and impose Presidential Rule in the state, ending a four-month period of intermittent protests and riots that left more than a hundred dead and thousands behind bars.

The JP movement could only be characterised by criticisms of the government and calls for a revolution. This tendency was only entrenched when it coalesced with political parties, particularly the Opposition’s opportunistic alliances.

Inspired by the success of Gujarat protests, a similar agitation arose in Bihar in March 1974. Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), a freedom fighter and political activist with a clean public image, came out of retirement and took leadership over the movement in Bihar. He called for a ‘Total Revolution’ or a ‘struggle against the very system which has compelled almost everybody to go corrupt’¹⁰.

Similar to Gujarat, there were burglars and arsonists sauntering about Bihar’s towns; railway stations were attacked, bombs were set off in fire stations, post offices were stoned, “posh hotels” and food warehouses were looted, and the army was called in with instructions to shoot on sight¹¹. The movement demanded the dissolution of the state government, and students and people were asked to pressurise the legislators to resign, paralyse the government, gherao (encircling a politician or government building until the demands are met) the state assembly and government offices, set up parallel people’s governments and courts all over the state, and pay no taxes¹².

JP expanded the movement across the country, demanding the ouster of the Congress and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from power, accusing them of large-scale corruption. According to Chandra et al. (2008), the campaign gained nationwide traction, drawing support from diverse social groups, including students, the middle classes, traders, and sections of the Intelligentsia.

Yet, the movement lacked a coherent ideological framework and offered no concrete alternative to the government it sought to dissolve. What would replace the government in a partyless democracy? What structures would sustain it? JP did not hold the answers to these questions. At times he would suggest all production would be “brought under collective ownership and control”; just a few pages later, “collectivisation” and the “redistribution of land” are deemed futile because such ideas “might require 60 to 70 per cent of the population to be repressed”¹³.

The movement could only be characterised by criticisms of the government and calls for a revolution.

This tendency was only entrenched when it coalesced with political parties, particularly the Opposition’s opportunistic alliances. The JP movement came to include the communal Jan Sangh and Jamaat-i-Islami, the RSS, Congress (O), and other Socialist parties. JP even declared that the “Bihar movement and RSS’s work are fundamentally the same”¹⁴. Notably, the late chief of RSS, Golwalker, in Our Nationhood Defined, had expressed that India should follow Nazi Germany, saying, “Germany has shown that it is very difficult for fundamentally different races to be brought together. This is a lesson which India could learn and profit by”¹⁵.

As a result, the movement became a melting pot of every group whose goal was to remove Indira Gandhi from power. Its objective of bringing about change in policies or state governments, and fighting corruption transformed to Indira Hatao. The modus operandi were gheraos, violent agitations, boycott of courts, formation of parallel governments and courts, and even calls to the army, police and civil services to rebel against the government and disobey its orders¹⁶.

On November 5, 1974, JP led a march in Patna to gherao the secretariat and the residences of ministers. The Central Reserve Police Force and the Border Security Force were deployed to stifle the unrest. The Forces attacked protestors with lathis and tear gas–JP himself was not spared. The movement did eventually die down by the end of 1974. But, the prevailing climate of violence at the time resulted in the assassination of the Railway Minister, LN Mishra, and an attempt on the life of the Chief Justice, AN Ray.

The State’s repression and bodies piling up on the street dissuaded JP’s middle-class supporters, who also found new appreciation for Indira Gandhi’s monetary discipline, and students returned to their colleges. However, JP did not step back from his efforts to overhaul the government. On March 6, 1975, he led a five-mile march through Delhi in what was the city’s largest demonstration ever, with a crowd estimated at between 1,00,000 and 7,50,000. The rally ended at the Parliament House where he presented the Speaker with a “charter of demands”, calling for electoral reform, land redistribution, and Indira Gandhi’s resignation¹⁷.

The Final Moments…

The Allahabad Court’s judgment was the proverbial last straw that broke the camel’s back, and reinforced the JP movement. On June 12, 1975, Justice Sinha, on an election petition filed by Raj Narain, convicted Indira Gandhi for having indulged in illegal campaign practices and declared her election invalid. The court did not accept the charges of bribery or illegal soliciting of votes levied against her. It relied on two grounds for deeming the election invalid: misuse of government machinery for the election campaign, and illegal recruitment of a government official for election-related work.

The conviction meant that she could not participate in elections or hold office for six years, and called for her resignation. Jayaprakash Narayan, heading a movement which sought to create parallel courts, now banked on a judgment given by the very courts his movement disparaged to give it credence. For protestors, the judgment became definitive proof that those in power were indeed corrupt and Indira Gandhi was their ringleader. JP called for the immediate resignation of Indira Gandhi and planned to organise a countrywide campaign to force the issue. The threat of national unrest, violence, bandhs, ghearos, and deaths was at the horizon again.

The 1975 Emergency shows that democracy, once weakened, can collapse quickly– and unless we remember the perils of its suspension and remain vigilant citizens, incumbents may take a page out of ‘Indira’s handbook’.

On June 25, 1975, Jayaprakash Narayan called for a nationwide mass civil disobedience and a gherao of the Prime Minister’s residence. Morarji Desai proclaimed ‘‘We intend to overthrow her, to force her to resign. For good... Thousands of us will surround her house to prevent her from going out or receive visitors. We’ll camp there night and day shouting to her to resign”¹⁸.

Indira Gandhi was cornered, and a coup d’etat was brewing. To deal with the years of intermittent anarchy, lawlessness, widespread street protests and what she saw as extra-constitutional methods of resistance, the Emergency became a viable option. On the morning of June 26, 1975, following a proclamation under Article 352 of the Constitution, India would go into a state of Internal Emergency… and democracy would be suspended.

The Emergency was not born overnight. The entire gamut–Indira Gandhi, the Syndicate, Jayaprakash Narayan, opportunistic alliances, violent uprisings, the Bangladesh war, the refugee problem, and ultimately Congress’ failure to ameliorate the country from a crippled economy–has its share in the making of the crisis which led to the Emergency. As a new democracy, Indira Gandhi may have instinctively taken a page out of the colonial handbook. After all, Emergencies were the preferred mode of governance in colonies across the world–Malaysia, Kenya, Cyprus, Myanmar and many others. While it would be unreasonable to absolve Indira Gandhi of her role in the Emergency, the suspension of the fundamental rights created breathing space for her administration to respond to resistance as ‘appropriately’ as she deemed fit. But in democratic regimes that breath suffocates the people. The 1975 Emergency shows that democracy, once weakened, can collapse quickly–and unless we remember the perils of its suspension and remain vigilant citizens, incumbents may take a page out of ‘Indira’s handbook’.

References

• 1&2 Chandra, B., Mukherjee, M., & Mukherjee A. (2008) India Since Independence. Penguin UK.
• 3&4 Murshid, N. (2011). India’s Role in Bangladesh’s War of Independence: Humanitarianism or Self-interest? Economic and Political Weekly, 53-60.
• 5&6 Bose, S. (2005). Anatomy of violence: Analysis of civil war in East Pakistan in 1971. Economic and Political Weekly, 4463-4471.
• 7 Mitra, S. K., Schottli, J., & Pauli, M. (2023). Indira Gandhi and the radical break in India’s foreign policy. In Statecraft and Foreign Policy: India 1947-2023 (pp. 71–84). DCU Press.
• 8&9 Chandra, B., Mukherjee, M., & Mukherjee A. (2008) India Since Independence. Penguin UK.
• 10&11 Jaffrelot, C., & Anil, P. (2021). India’s first dictatorship: the emergency, 1975-1977. Oxford University Press.
• 12 Supra note 1
• 13 Supra note 10
• 14 Supra note 1
• 15 Supra note 1
• 16 Supra Note 10
• 17&18 Dutt, V. P. (1976). The Emergency in India: Background and Rationale. Asian Survey, 16(12), 1124-1138.
• 19&20 Supra Note 10

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