Police Reforms in India

Swapna Jha*

After Independence, India witnessed profound political, social, and economic transformations. The police were expected to be no longer just a colonial force to maintain order; they became central to delivering justice, safeguarding rights, and even enabling social change and economic growth. Yet the institution remained governed by the outdated Police Act of 1861, leaving it vulnerable to political interference, weak accountability mechanisms, arbitrary transfers, custodial violence, poor investigation standards, declining public trust and systemic abuse of power. This gap between the people’s democratic aspirations and the police’s colonial structure was at the heart of public mistrust.

Recognising this urgent need for reform, Prakash Singh, former Director General of Police (DGP), and N K Singh, along with Common Cause, filed a Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court (SC) in 1996. While the police veterans exposed the internal distortions of the force, Common Cause brought in the citizens’ perspectives, showing how unchecked police power had led to custodial torture, arbitrary arrests, fabricated cases, and widespread denial of justice, especially for the poor and marginalised.

For Common Cause, this was not only about institutional efficiency but about restoring public faith in the rule of law. The petitioners relied extensively on the findings of previous commissions to recommend better policing mechanisms. Observing the gravity of the situation and the absence of legislative action, SC held that it could no longer wait for governments to act and was compelled to issue binding directions for immediate compliance.

The Court clarified that these directions would operate as law under Article 142 of the Constitution until suitable legislation was enacted.

The SC’s judgment in Prakash Singh and Others v. Union of India and Others (2006) thus represents a historic intervention. The judgment, delivered on September 22, 2006, laid down seven binding directives aimed at initiating comprehensive police reform across the country. These directions were to remain in force until appropriate legislation was enacted by the Central and State Governments.

Background to the Prakash Singh Case

The demand for police reform in India was not new. The National Police Commission (NPC) was constituted in 1977 to make a comprehensive review of the police system. The NPC submitted eight reports between February 1979 and May 1981. The first report was laid in the Lok Sabha on February 1, 1980. The remaining reports were released in March 1983 with the specific directive from the Central Government to all State Governments/UT Administrations that these reports be examined quickly and appropriate action be taken. The Central Government took steps towards persuading the State Governments/UTs to implement the NPC’s recommendations.

Since NPC, several committees and commissions, including the Ribeiro Committee, Padmanabhaiah Committee, and Malimath Committee, have studied the systemic failures of policing and proposed reforms. These bodies consistently identified political interference, lack of professionalism, absence of accountability, and outdated legal frameworks as core problems. However, their recommendations were largely ignored due to a lack of political will.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Prakash Singh and Others v. Union of India and Others (2006) represents a historic intervention. The judgment, delivered on September 22, 2006, laid down seven binding directives aimed at initiating comprehensive police reform across the country.

Structure and Philosophy of the Directives

The directions inter alia passed by the Court were:

• Constitute a State Security Commission on any of the models recommended by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the Ribeiro Committee or the Sorabjee Committee.
• Select the Director General of Police (DGP) of the State from amongst three senior-most officers of the department empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), and provide him a minimum tenure of at least two years, irrespective of his date of superannuation.
• Prescribe a minimum tenure of two years to the police officers on operational duties.
• Separate investigating police from law & order police, starting with towns/ urban areas having a population of ten lakhs or more, and gradually extend to smaller towns/urban areas,
• Set up a Police Establishment Board at the State level to decide all transfers, postings, promotions and other service-related matters of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (DySP).
• Constitute Police Complaints Authorities at the State and District level to look into complaints against police officers.
• Set up a National Security Commission at the Union Level to prepare a panel for being placed before the appropriate Appointing Authority, for selection and placement of Chiefs of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs), who should also be given a minimum tenure of two years, with additional mandate to review from time-to-time measures to upgrade the effectiveness of these forces, improve the service conditions of its personnel, ensure there is proper coordination between them and that the forces are generally utilised for the purposes they were raised and make recommendations in that behalf.

These seven directives can be broadly divided into two categories:

(A) Measures to ensure functional and operational autonomy of the police.

(B) Measures to strengthen accountability and oversight mechanisms.

SC sought to strike a balance between autonomy and accountability, recognising that excessive political control undermines professionalism, while unchecked autonomy risks abuse of power.

A. Measures on Functional Autonomy

State Security Commission: The first directive mandates the establishment of a State Security Commission (SSC) in every State to ensure that the State government does not exercise unwarranted influence on the police. The SSC is tasked with laying down broad policy guidelines, evaluating police performance, and ensuring policing is conducted in accordance with constitutional norms.

The NPC dealt with a wide range of aspects of police functioning and submitted eight reports between February 1979 and May 1981. The first report was laid in the Lok Sabha on February 1, 1980.

SC required that the SSC’s recommendations be binding on the State Government. It suggested that States could adopt models proposed by the NHRC, the Ribeiro Committee, or the Sorabjee Committee.

The Model Police Act, 2006, drafted by the Police Act Drafting Committee headed by Soli Sorabjee, provides the most comprehensive framework. It envisages a Commission chaired by the Chief Minister or Home Minister, with the DGP as ex-officio Secretary, and a majority of independent, non-political members, including a retired High Court judge and civil society representatives.

The Model Police Act also introduces systematic performance evaluation based on indicators such as operational efficiency, public satisfaction, victim satisfaction, accountability, and human rights compliance.

Appointment & Tenure of the Director General of Police: The second directive concerns the appointment and tenure of the DGP. To prevent arbitrary appointments, the Court directed that the DGP be selected by the State Government from among the three senior-most IPS officers empanelled by the UPSC. The selection must be based on length of service, a very good service record, and range of experience.

The DGP must have a minimum tenure of two years, irrespective of the date of superannuation. Removal is permitted only on specific grounds such as disciplinary proceedings, criminal conviction, corruption, or physical or mental incapacity. The Model Police Act further clarifies the criteria for assessing a “very good record,” including appraisal reports, integrity, and service distinctions.

Minimum Tenure for Field Officers:The third directive extends the principle of security of tenure to key operational officers, including the Inspector General of Police (IG) in charge of a zone, Deputy Inspector General of Police (DyIG) in charge of a range, Superintendent of Police (SP) in charge of a district, and Station House Officer (SHO) in charge of a police station. These officers are entitled to a minimum tenure of two years.

Premature transfers are allowed only in cases of disciplinary proceedings, criminal conviction, corruption, or incapacity. The Model Police Act allows limited additional grounds, such as gross inefficiency or serious misconduct, subject to written reasons and review by the Police Establishment Board.

Police Establishment Board: The fourth directive mandates the creation of a Police Establishment Board (PEB) in each State, comprising the DGP and four senior-most police officers. Its purpose is to bring professionalism and transparency to decisions regarding transfers, postings, promotions, and service-related matters.

The Board has the authority to decide transfers and postings for officers up to the rank of DySP and to make recommendations for officers of higher ranks. It also functions as an appellate forum for senior officers aggrieved by service-related decisions. State Government interference is permitted only in exceptional cases with recorded reasons.

National Security Commission: The fifth directive applies at the Union level and requires the establishment of a National Security Commission (NSC). It is tasked with preparing panels for the appointment of chiefs of CPOs and ensuring them a minimum tenure of two years. It is also responsible for reviewing measures to improve effectiveness, coordination, and service conditions of these forces and ensuring they are used for their intended purposes.

Since the establishment of the NPC, several committees and commissions, including the Ribeiro Committee, Padmanabhaiah Committee, and Malimath Committee, have studied the systemic failures of policing and proposed reforms.

B. Measures on Accountability

Police Complaints Authorities: The sixth directive introduces an independent Police Complaints Authorities (PCA) at the State and District levels to inquire into allegations of serious police misconduct.

At the State level, the Authority is to be headed by a retired SC or High Court judge and will examine complaints against officers of the rank of SP and above. At the District level, the Authority is to be headed by a retired District Judge and will examine complaints against officers up to the rank of DySP.

These two authorities are empowered to inquire into cases involving custodial death, grievous hurt, rape, extortion, land grabbing, and serious abuse of authority. Their recommendations for departmental or criminal action are binding on the concerned authorities.

Separation of Investigation & Law and Order: The seventh directive mandates the separation of investigation and law-and-order functions of the police to improve the quality and speed of criminal investigations. SC directed that this should begin in urban areas with a population of one million or more and gradually be extended to smaller towns.

The Model Police Act provides a detailed framework for this separation, including the creation of Special Crime Investigation Units at police stations, District-level investigation cells, and a strengthened Criminal Investigation Department at the State level. Investigating officers are to be posted for fixed tenures and insulated from routine law-and-order duties.

State Responses & Supreme Court Monitoring

SC required compliance with the directives by December 31, 2006, and the filing of affidavits by January 3, 2007. State responses varied, ranging from partial compliance through executive orders to outright opposition. Several States sought extensions on the grounds that they were drafting new police legislation.

In a subsequent order, dated January 11, 2007, SC rejected all objections and reaffirmed that the directives were binding. It clarified that three directives—security of tenure for the DGP and field officers and the establishment of PEBs—were self-executory and required immediate compliance, while granting limited additional time for the remaining directives.

Conclusion

The Prakash Singh judgment, along with the Model Police Act, 2006, provides a comprehensive framework to transform the police from a colonial force into a democratic service oriented toward the protection of rights and the rule of law. It attempts to strike a balance between autonomy and accountability, professionalism and public oversight.

The judgment continues to serve as a constitutional benchmark against which police reform efforts are measured. The success of these reforms depends on genuine political commitment and faithful implementation rather than symbolic or cosmetic compliance.

In its order on January 11, 2007, the Supreme Court clarified that three directives—security of tenure for the DGP and field officers and the establishment of PEBs—were selfexecutory and required immediate compliance, while granting limited additional time for the remaining directives.

---

NEXT »

Who Controls the Constable?